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ABSTRACT
The effect of reward with which we are all most familiar 
is the facilitating one so frequently found in studies that measure 
the rate, speed, and persistence of responding. Not so familiar 
are reward's detrimental effects. As the first part of the disser­
tation, literature on both the facilitating and detrimental effects 
of reward was reviewed in order to determine the crucial character­
istics distinguishing tasks on which reward facilitates from tasks 
on which it has a detrimental effect. Two such characteristics 
were found. The first regards the subject's initial attitude to­
ward the task (the aversive-attractive dimension) and the second, 
the type cognitive behavior required to solve the task as effic­
iently as possible (the algorithmic-heuristic dimension). Post Hoa 
these two dimensions account rather well for reward-nonreward dif­
ferences uncovered in studies using perceptual motor, operant, 
verbal learning, perceptual recognition, incidental learning, dis­
crimination learning, and problem solving tasks. Reward has been 
detrimental only when the task was attractive to the subject and 
required heuristic behavior for its solution.
The dissertation research has been to l®ok at the effect 
of reward on the discovery of a "nonset" solution. Two studies 
were conducted. In both, college students were either monetarily 
rewarded or not for solving a series of water-jar problems. It was
vii
hypothesized that reward subjects would take longer to find a 
simple (A-C) solution after developing a mental set to use a more 
complicated (B-A-2C) solution than would nonreward subjects. In 
both studies, poorer reward group performance was obtained as pre­
dicted. Explanations for these differences in terms of differences 
in either mathematical ability, time taken to check answers, or 
concern over quality of performance were considered and discounted. 
These results are consistent with the view that reward will have a 
detrimental effect on performance when it is superfluous to creating 
an initially high level of motivation and when the task is one that 
requires heuristic behavior for its solution.
Vlll
MONETARY REWARD AND WATER-JAR TASK PERFORMANCE:
EVIDENCE OF A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT OF REWARD ON PROBLEM SOLVING
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
There is a general assumption among psychologists, 
educators, and businessmen that the addition of external incentives 
to a situation will improve performance, yet there is a growing 
literature which can be used to argue that this is not necessarily 
the case. In the children's discrimination literature in particu­
lar, studies using between-group designs have shown that children 
who are rewarded for correct responses (MGMs, marbles, tokens, and 
money are typically used) do not learn as quickly as ones who are 
given only knowledge of results. A host of studies supports this 
conclusion: McCullers and Martin, 1971; McGraw and McCullers, 1974;
Miller and Estes, 1961; Schere, 1969; Spence, 1970; Spence and 
Dunton, 1967; Spence and Segner, 1967; and Terrell, Durkin, and 
Wiesley, 1959.
But laboratory discrimination studies like these in which 
reward is provided trial-by-trial do not on the surface at least 
bear much resemblance to the type performance situations educators, 
businessmen, and mothers are concerned with. The question becomes,
1
2then, whether the poorer performance by reward groups in discrimina­
tion learning is a trivial case, a phenomenon complete in itself 
with no wider implications for the effects of reward in general, or 
whether the poorer performance observed in this one instance is an 
outcropping of a heretofore unrecognized detrimental effect which 
reward can have on behavior.
A review of the literature indicates that the detrimental 
effect of reward may indeed be more general than the discrimination 
learning results alone would imply. In adult incidental learning, 
for example, reward has been frequently observed to hinder perfor­
mance on the incidental task, the one requiring use of previously 
irrelevant stimuli. This has been the case both when the incidental 
stimuli were spatially removed from (Bahrick, Fitts, and Rankin,
1954; McNamara and Fisch, 1964; Johnson and Thomson, 1960; Davis 
and Lovelace, 1963) and spatially contiguous with (Bahrick, 1952; 
Staat and McCullers, Note 4) the stimuli of the intentional task.
A detrimental effect of reward on performance has been ob­
served on other tasks outside the discrimination learning paradigm 
as well. Kruglanski, Friedman, and Zeevi (1971), for example, found 
that fifth-grade school children offered an extrinsic incentive for 
performance on a battery of five tests designed to measure recall 
and creativity were inferior in both recall and creativity to a 
group that was offered no incentive. Weick (1964), using a series 
of concept attainment tasks, found the same effect with adults. The 
subjects rewarded with an external incentive found fewer concepts in 
a 20-minute experimental session, expended less effort, and rated
3the task as less interesting than did nonrewarded subjects. In 
both the above studies, reward was nonmaterial and noncontingent 
indicating that the detrimental effect of reward may not be re­
stricted just to the contingent, material rewards employed in the 
children's discrimination literature.
Condry (Note 1) and McGraw and McCullers (Note 3) have 
used concept attainment tasks and monetary incentives to obtain 
further evidence for a detrimental effect of reward. The subjects 
in the former study were high school students. The reward subjects 
among them received $.50 for each of six concept attainment problems 
they solved. On two measures of performance--number of information 
requests needed to reach solution and proportion of logical to il­
logical requests--reward subjects were shown to be inferior to non­
reward subjects. McGraw and McCullers obtained similar results using 
adults. In this study the time taken to achieve a solution was re­
corded along with the number of information requests. On each of 
four problems, reward subjects ($.50 per solution) took longer and 
asked more questions than did nonreward subjects, but the differences 
were not statistically reliable.
Adult problem solving studies offer few instances of reward 
-nonreward comparisons, but those that exist tend to show reward to 
have a detrimental effect. Viesti (1971), for example, describes two 
experiments he conducted using an "insight learning task." On each 
page of a fifteen page booklet there appeared a set of three computer 
generated patterns. Two of the patterns were 2/3 redundant and the 
other was completely different. The subject's job was to say which 
of the three patterns was different. In both studies, nonreward
4subjects were correct more often than reward subjects. Two studies 
by Glucksberg (1962, 1964) have shown reward subjects take longer 
to solve difficult functional-fixedness problems than nonreward 
subjects.
In summary, there is substantial evidence to encourage 
the view that reward may have negative consequences on performance 
that are of general importance. The evidence is extensive in terms 
of subject populations sampled, tasks, procedures, and dependent 
measures. More than the results of any one study, it is this breadth 
of instances in which reward has been observed to produce a detri­
mental effect which makes it appear unlikely that the reward-nonreward 
differences in children's discrimination learning are artifactual.
Alongside the literature that shows reward to have a detri­
mental effect, there is the more voluminous and familiar literature 
which shows reward to be a facilitator. Elsewhere (Note 2) I have 
contrasted studies which show reward to have a detrimental effect 
with those that show reward to facilitate on the basis of two dimen­
sions which seem to be crucial to determining what reward's effect 
will be in a specific case. These were named the aversive-attractive 
and algorithmic-heuristic dimensions.
The aversive-attractive dimension specifies the subject's 
attitude toward the task. Aversive tasks are those on which the 
subject would not choose to participate were it not for some incen­
tive. Examples from standard laboratory tasks are those which re­
quire sustained and unchallenging perceptual-motor responding as in 
the various lever-pulling, vigilance, and tracking tasks. In clear
5contrast with these are tasks which are inherently interesting such 
as concept formation and other types of problem-solving tasks. For 
these, the offer of an incentive is superfluous since incentives 
are not needed to obtain an initially high level of motivation.
One characteristic shared by all the tasks used in studies showing 
reward to have a detrimental effect is that they have been attractive.
While attractiveness may be a necessary attribute of tasks 
which show reward to have a detrimental effect, it is not sufficient 
because there are numerous examples of reward facilitation on attrac­
tive tasks. A good example of this is speed tests of mental multi­
plication (Weinstein, 1971a, 1971b, 1972). For this reason it is 
necessary to specify the algorithmic-heuristic dimension as second 
means of distinguishing tasks on which reward will facilitate from 
those on which it will have a detrimental effect.
Mental multiplication was chosen as an example of an at­
tractive task on which reward facilitates performance because what 
is meant by algorithmic is clearest in this case. "Algorithmic" pro­
blems such as mental multiplication may be difficult, but there is 
no question about where to begin or how to proceed. In contrast with 
mental multiplication problems are heuristic problems, such as those 
requiring insight and creativity, in which the whole problem is de­
termining what steps are relevant for a solution. This characteris­
tic, like attractiveness, has been common to all the studies in which 
reward has had a detrimental effect.
A task which lies near the attractive and heuristic ex­
tremes of the aversive-attractive and algorithmic-heuristic dimensions
6is the mental set task employing water-jar problems that was used 
by Luchins (1942). This task is designed to establish a mental set 
for a relatively complicated, indirect solution to a type of arith­
metic problem and then to test whether a subject is subsequently 
able to find a simpler, direct solution to the same type problem.
Such a task is heuristic because breaking a mental set is paradig­
matic of what is meant by heuristic behavior. The attractiveness 
of the task for college students, who tend to view it as a test 
of intelligence, is evident to any one who has ever administered it.
On the basis of the model developed from the available literature 
then, a water-jar task should be optimal for producing a detrimental 
effect of reward on performance. Consequently, it was chosen for 
use in the present research, the goal of which was to add to the 
literature on the detrimental effect of reward. A larger literature 
demonstrating this effect was deemed necessary for two reasons.
First, it is not commonly acknowledged at present that there is any 
such thing as a "detrimental" effect of reward on performance.
Second, if theorizing in this area is to be fruitful, a larger liter­
ature than is currently available needs to accumulate so that specu­
lation on the causes of reward's detrimental effect will not be based 
on the results of studies from a single area, studies that are method­
ology bound, or unreplicated studies.
CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT I
In the first experiment, adult subjects were given a series 
of ten water-jar problems. Problems one to five were soluble in a 
single way by a well-defined rule which involved using all three of 
the available jars in a precise way. The next four problems could 
be solved using the same solution as problems one to five (the 
mental set solution) but there was, in addition, a direct solution 
that required using only two of the jars. This solution was concep­
tually and mathematically simpler and an obvious solution if subjects 
could but see it. Problem ten in the series--which after Luchins 
(1942) we call the extinction problem— was designed to force subjects 
to see the alternative, two-jar solution since no three-jar combina­
tion would provide the correct answer. Given Luchins' (1942) dis­
covery of the persistence with which mental set solutions are applied, 
it was expected that most subjects would not find the novel solution 
until the last problem, so time-to-solution on this problem provided 
a convenient measure of the facility with which subjects could break 
set. The specific predictions made for performance were that sub­
jects offered a reward for each correct solution would, first, be 
less likely to find the direct solution on problems six to nine and, 
second, take longer to solve the extinction problem than would nonre­
ward subjects.
8Method
Subjects and Design.
The subjects were thirty undergraduates enrolled in intro­
ductory psychology at the University of Oklahoma whose participa­
tion in the experiment partially fulfilled a course requirement. 
Subjects were randomly assigned by pairs to the reward and nonre­
ward experimental conditions with the first pair member going to 
one group and the second to the other. There were thus fifteen 
subjects per group. The design of the study was a simple groups-by- 
trials design with two levels of the between factor (reward and non­
reward) and ten levels of the within factor (problems).
Task.
The ten water-jar problems that made up the task are pre­
sented in Table 1. The first five problems could only be solved 
using the formula B-A-2C meaning that jar "B" was to be filled, and 
then, from "B", jar "A" was to be filled once and jar "C" twice, 
leaving the desired amount as a remainder in "B". Problems six 
through nine had dual solutions. The subjects could either continue 
to use the old formula (B-A-2C) or switch to an alternative proce­
dure (either A-C or A+C depending on the problem). The last problem 
in the series was the only one not soluble by the formula B-A-2C.
Its solution was A-C.
Procedure.
Five sample problems were used to introduce the subject to 
the task and to familiarize him with the method of recording his
Table 1
Wafer Jar task for Experiment 1
Number & Type of Problem Given these jars Obtain this amount
A B C
1. 19 139 9 102
2 . 1 14 163 25 99
3. I Single-solution 18 43 10 5
4 . 16 79 11 41
5 .
1
9 64 15 25
6 , 23 49 3 20
7 . 39 3 18
8 . Dual-solution 14 36 8 6
9 ., 18 48 4 22
10. Extinction problem 27 80 4 23
Water Jar task for Experiment 2
The following problems were substituted for 6 ,7 ,8 , and 9 above.
6. 18 125 5 97
7 . 13 42 9 11
a.  ^ Dual-solution 27 95 12 44
9. ' 14 37 8 7
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answer which was to write the solution as a formula, e.g., B-A-2C, 
A+C, A-C. The problems were typed on index cards so that the sub­
ject would work on but one at a time. Separate sheets were pro­
vided for the answers. On completing each answer, the subject put 
both the answer sheet and the problem card in a box to his right be­
fore going on to the next problem in the series. This procedure not 
only assured that the subject would not return to a problem already 
completed but also it provided a cue to the experimenter, who was be­
hind a one-way glass keeping times-to-solution, that the subject had 
finished the problem and was ready for the next.
In the instructions the subject was told that he would have 
as long as he needed to find a correct solution to each of the pro­
blems and that he would be left alone to work. Reward subjects were 
told that they would receive a nickel for each correct answer and a 
fifty-cent bonus if all were correct. The bonus was provided to in­
sure the importance of the reward on problem ten. Had a constant 
reward of ten cents been offered for each problem, the additional 
monetary inducement for solving problem ten would have been small 
relative to the ninety cents subjects would have already won. The 
rationale given for offering money at all was that the experimenter 
had found it necessary to "motivate people a little to get them to 
work until they find the correct answer" and that the little money 
spent was well worth the time and energy saved by not having to run 
extra subjects.
On completing the instructions, the experimenter went to an 
adjoining room from where he could observe by one-way mirror. The
11
mirror was to the side and behind the subject who sat at a desk 
facing a blank wall. There was no attempt to deceive subjects 
regarding the mirror. Each was told that it was there and that the 
experimenter would look through from time to time to see how the 
subject was coming. The only deception used was in specifically 
instructing subjects that time was not crucial when in fact it was 
the all important dependent measure. The reason for not telling 
subjects that times were being recorded was to make the situation 
as stress free as possible. Despite their being instructed that 
time was not important, no subject stopped in his task to gaze about 
the room or to fiddle with non-task materials. Without exception, 
subjects moved from one problem to the next in a very conscientious 
manner.
Time-to-solution was recorded for each problem in the ten- 
problem series by means of stopwatches. Timing began when the sub­
ject turned over a problem card and ended when he placed that card 
along with his answer in the box to his right. When a subject had 
completed all ten problems, the experimenter explained the purpose 
of the study, answered any questions, and paid the reward subjects.
Results and Discussion
Subjects differed in when and whether they broke set. Some 
found the direct two-jar solution between problems six and nine; 
others found it only on the extinction problem (problem ten) when it 
was the single available solution. In addition, there were some sub­
jects who persisted even on the extinction problem to use, erroneously.
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a three-jar, set solution. On the basis of such differences, sub­
jects were divided into four categories.
Category I included subjects who used a direct two-jar solu­
tion at least twice before problem ten and then did not revert to 
the old three-jar solution. These subjects, on the basis of their 
rapid solution times for the latter problems in the series and on 
the basis of their post-experimental verbal reports, had clearly 
broken set prior to problem ten, and so did not begin work on the 
final problem with the expectation that the old solution would work. 
Category II subjects used a direct, two-jar solution on one of the 
problems six to eight but only on one of these and not on nine. The 
fact that these subjects reverted to the old solution might indicate
that their one experience with two-jar solutions had not been suf-
2
ficient to break their mental set. Category III subjects used the 
B-A-2C solution in every case where it was applicable but then suc­
ceeded in finding the direct, two-jar solution on the extinction pro­
blem. Category IV subjects never broke set and after much effort 
gave some very complex but incorrect three-jar solution as their 
answer to problem ten. These four subject categories are ordered by 
the extent to which subjects in each are presumed to have been af­
fected by their mental sets with Category I subjects being the least, 
and Category IV subjects, the most affected. A summary of the four 
categories and the number of subjects in each is given in Table 2. 
Three subjects (two nonreward and one reward) are not included in 
Table 2 because they made a number of errors on the first five pro­
blems and, therefore, failed to establish a mental set. Since the
13
Table 2
Numbers of Subjects and Meanlime -To-Solution on Problem Ten for Each of
Four Subject Categories 
Categories Reward Nonreward
,n Mean time (sec.) ii Mean time (sec.)
1. Broke set on two or more 2 25 .8 3 25.3
problems prior to Ten
I I .  Broke set on only one problem 2 205.1 3 44 .9
prior to Ten and then reverted to
B - A - 2 C
II I .  Broke set only on Problem Ten 7 236.3 6 134.7
IV , Never broke set 3 431.6® 1 431.6°
Totals 14^ 1 ^
°These subjects failed to solve Problem Ten and so were assigned a solution time equal to 
the slowest time of the Category III subjects.
^One reward and two nonreward subjects were eliminated for failing to establish set.
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hypotheses to be investigated regarded differential performance in 
breaking set, the data of these subjects who never established set 
became irrelevant and were eliminated from the principal analyses.
Due jointly to the proliferation of categories, the loss of 
the three subjects who failed to establish set, and the initially 
small sample, a statistical test of the hypothesis that nonreward 
subjects would break set earlier in the ten problem series than the 
reward subjects was impracticable for lack of power. Nevertheless, 
since the subjects in Categories I and II are those who were least 
blinded and those in Category IV the subjects who were most blinded 
by their mental sets, it is in conformity with expectations that 
there were more nonreward subjects in the former two categories and 
fewer in the latter than reward subjects (6 to 4 and 1 to 3 respect­
ively) .
In addition to the prediction that nonreward subjects would 
be more likely to find a direct solution prior to problem ten, it was 
predicted that nonreward subjects would be faster to find the A-C 
solution on the extinction problem than would the reward subjects.
The mean extinction problem solution times for the reward and non­
reward groups are given by subject category in Table 2. Category IV 
subjects, because they failed to solve problem ten, had to be as­
signed a solution time for this problem. On the basis of the judg­
ment that Category IV subjects were inferior in performance to sub­
jects in Category III, the four subjects in Category IV were assigned 
the same solution time as was obtained by the slowest of the Category 
III subjects, 431 sec. Using this procedure, the mean solution time
15
for the nonreward subjects on problem ten was 112 sec. and for the 
reward subjects it was 244 sec., _t(25) = 2.36, 2.<.0S. This differ­
ence clearly supports the prediction that nonreward subjects would 
be faster to solve the extinction problem. Figure 1 shows that 
this superiority of nonreward subjects, which was dramatically pre­
sent on problem ten, was to some extent present on the other nine 
problems as well. A group by trials analysis of variance revealed 
this consistent difference to be significant, £(l,lSj =5.65, p^ <.05.
The possibility was considered that the solution-time dif­
ferences on problem ten might simply indicate that reward subjects 
took greater care with their answers than did nonreward subjects.
One argument against this possibility is that the problems required 
only simple addition and subtraction. Because of this, it is logical 
to assume that most of the time recorded here as "solution time" was 
in fact time spent to discover and not to check an answer. This 
argument is particularly applicable to problem ten where it is dif­
ficult to imagine subjects spending appreciable time to verify the 
result 27 -4 =23. Observations support this view. On problem ten, 
the modal subject gave some visible sign of discovery. The time 
taken to record and turn in an answer following this was never more 
than about 15 seconds. Further supporting the view that it was dis­
covery time and not checking time which differentiated reward from 
nonreward subjects on problem ten are the data for subjects in Cate­
gory I (Table 2). For these subjects who had already discovered the 
direct solution prior to problem ten, the time taken to verify, re­
cord, and turn in their answers was a uniform 25 seconds.
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A complement to the argument that reward subjects took more 
time because they took more care is the argument that nonreward sub­
jects took less time because, having no need to be overly concerned 
whether an answer was correct or incorrect, these subjects emphasized 
speed at the expense of quality. Had this been the case, there should 
have been some indications of poorer quality of performance by non­
reward subjects in a measure such as number of errors.
In designing the task, care was taken to make errors mini­
mally probable by giving subjects a number of practice problems, un­
limited time to work the task problems, and ample scratch paper to 
verify each result. Despite these precautions, errors were still 
made. Solutions judged to be errors included not only miscalculations 
but also unrecorded answers (caused by a subject's giving up), and 
solutions which were mathematically correct but in violation of the 
terms of the problem. Illustrating such an error is the solution 
given by one subject that depended on the presence of a negative 
three units of water in Jar B following one of the operations. There 
were five errors of this latter sort. Responsible for four of them 
were the two nonreward subjects who were eliminated for failing to 
establish set. Out of the 150 solutions (10 problems x 15 subjects) 
from each group, there were a total of fifteen errors made by reward 
subjects and nine by nonreward subjects. Contributing to these 
totals were eight of the reward subjects as compared to just four of 
the nonreward subjects. From these results it can hardly be argued 
that nonreward subjects acheived their speed of responding at the ex­
pense of quality. To the contrary, it is the quality of the reward
18
group performance which appears to be inferior. This is a surprising 
result in light of the fact that reward subjects were specifically 
told that obtaining the maximum reward of $1.00 was contingent on 
their finding a correct solution for each of the ten problems.
It has been argued that the faster nonreward solution times 
on problem ten can be attributed neither to differences in quality 
of performance nor to differences in time used to check answers.
The question remains whether the nonreward superiority can be attri­
buted solely to the reward variable. Since it would seem that mathe­
matically ability should play a large part in how well a subject per­
formed on the water-jar task, we sought post hoc to determine whether 
the groups were evenly matched on this characteristic. As estimates 
of mathematical ability, college-bound percentiles based on scores 
on the mathematics usage section of the American College Test (ACT) 
were available for eleven reward and eleven nonreward subjects. This 
twenty-two-subject subset of the twenty-seven subjects included in 
the analysis differed significantly in aptitude, ^(20) =2.14, £<.05. 
The reward subjects had the lower scores meaning that mathematical 
aptitude was partially confounded with treatment. Dividing ACT scores 
at the median revealed that seven of the eleven subjects below the 
median were in the reward group. With the mean ACT percentile being 
.67, the mean for reward subjects was .57 and for nonreward subjects, 
.78. The sample estimate of the correlation of ACT percentiles with 
solution times on problem ten, r = -.32, £>.10, gives an indication 
of the magnitude of the effect this confounding might have had on the 
obtained group differences. While nonsignificant, this value is
19
large enough that because of the partial confounding with treatment, 
it poses some problem for the interpretation of the data offered 
here. Since there is no way to correct for confounding after the 
fact, the question of whether the reward variable would have a 
significant effect even when not partially confounded with mathema­
tical ability was left for the second experiment.
CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT II
Because the reward group in the previous study had a dis­
proportionate number of low ability subjects, we undertook a repli­
cation prior to reporting our findings.
In the replication, a few procedural changes were made. The 
dual solution problems six through nine from the water-jar task were 
replaced by single-solution set problems. Also, subjects who re­
corded incorrect answers to problem ten were asked to continue until 
they found a correct solution. These two changes were designed to 
eliminate subject categories I, II, and IV, that is, subjects who 
either broke set early or not at all. This simplified the test of 
the hypothesis that reward subjects would take longer to discover the 
A-C solution on the extinction problem than would nonreward subjects. 
A third change was to increase from fifty cents to one dollar the 
bonus for getting all ten problems correct. This raised the total 
reward from $1.00 to $1.50. The one design change was to include ACT 
mathematics usage percentile scores as a blocking variable. The ad­
visability of this change was made evident by the fairly large cor­
relation found in the first study between ACT and solution time on 
problem ten.
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In this second study, data were also collected on subjects' 
attitudes toward the task. This provided both a means for verifying 
that the water-jar task was truly perceived as attractive by the 
college student subjects--we only assumed this in Experiment I--and 
a means for replicating work by Deci (1971), Lepper, Greene, and 
Nisbett (1973), Kruglanski, Alon, and Lewis (1972), and Kruglanski, 
Friedman, and Zeevi (1971) concerning reward's effect on motivation. 
This work argues that when a subject is rewarded for a task which he 
is already intrinsically motivated to perform, he will be induced to 
attribute his participation to the reward with the result that his 
intrinsic motivation is reduced. In the terms developed here, this 
would mean that reward turns attractive tasks into aversive ones.
Deci (1971) and Lepper et ai. (1973) were able to show such an effect 
using behavioral measures; Kruglanski and his colleagues have done 
the same using a questionnaire. In related work, Benson (1970) used 
semantic differentials to assess changes in attitude toward reading 
after a semester-long reward program had been used to improve reading 
skills. While the reward group in Benson's study held a slightly 
more favorable attitude than controls at the start of the study, their 
attitude toward reading at the end was significantly below that of 
controls. For convenience, semantic differentials were used in the 
present study. These were administered at the end of the task and 
again about two weeks later in order that attitude change could be 
studied as a function of time as well as treatment.
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Method
Subj ects.
The subjects were forty introductory psychology students 
as described in Experiment I. ACT scores were available for thirty- 
two of these subjects. Data were nontheless collected from the 
eight subjects not having ACT scores. Six additional subjects began 
the study but were dropped. Five were dropped because of their ex­
ceptionally poor performance on the sample problems; the sixth was 
dropped when he failed to find the solution to problem one within 
the 45 minutes allowed for the experimental session. Of these six 
subjects eliminated for poor performance, three would have been in 
the reward group and three in the nonreward group. Of the thirty-two 
primary subjects, sixteen were in each treatment group. A median 
split was used to divide subjects into high and low categories on the 
ACT variable. Using this procedure there were eight highs and eight 
lows in the reward group, seven highs and nine lows in the nonreward 
group.
A major purpose of this replication study was to control for 
mathematical ability as estimated by subjects' ACT percentiles. The 
sample distribution of ACT percentiles had a mean of .64 and a stan­
dard deviation of .27. The reward mean was .60 and the nonreward 
mean, .67. These means do not differ as indicated by the very small 
^ value, _t(30j = .70, £ = .50. ACT scores, therefore, were free of 
any confounding with incentive condition.
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Procedure.
Except for the changes noted in the introduction. Experi­
ment II was conducted in the same way as Experiment I. Following 
the experimental session and after subjects had been debriefed, 
the first of the semantic differentials was administered. On it 
there were two open-ended statements: "The water-jar task was..."
and "The research being done using the water-jar task is — ."
Each was followed by a set of seven-point scales which had evalua­
tive adjectives as their anchors. The choices in the set of scales 
following the first statement were exciting-dull, bad-good, mean- 
inful-meaningless, inferior-superior, interesting-boring, unimpor­
tant-important, and pleasant-unpleasant. The choices following the 
second statement were the same except that valuable-worthless was 
used in place of pleasant-unpleasant. Within two to three weeks 
after subjects had participated in Experiment 11, they were mailed 
a second semantic differential identical to the first along with a 
letter explaining that it had become necessary to collect additional 
information.
Results and Discussion
Although subjects who made initial errors on problem ten 
were encouraged to continue until they found the correct answer, 
three subjects gave up without ever discovering the A-C solution.
All three were in the reward group. In order that their data could 
be included in the analyses, these subjects were assigned a solu­
tion time of 15 minutes. The actual times they spent attempting to 
find a solution were 18, 28, and 40 minutes respectively.
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Solution time.
Considering just the data of those thirty-two subjects who 
had ACT scores, the mean solution times for the extinction problem 
were 143 sec. in the nonreward group and 338 sec. in the reward 
group, £(1,28)= 3.48, £.<.07. These results of course replicate, 
under conditions in which mathematical ability was controlled, the 
result of principal interest in Experiment I. Including the data 
of those subjects who had no ACT score only enhances the difference: 
nonreward mean = 122 sec., reward mean = 326 sec., £ (1,38) =5.63, 
£<.025.
Figure 2 graphically presents reward and nonreward solution 
times for each problem for the subjects who had ACT scores. As was 
true in the first study, there was a consistent tendency for nonre­
ward subjects to solve the water-jar problems more quickly. This 
consistency coupled with the large differences on problem ten made 
for a significant Incentive main effect in the repeated measures 
analysis of variance, £(1,28) = 6.30, £<.05. Including all forty 
subjects in the analysis did not alter the effect, £(1,38)= 4.71,
£<.05.
As in the first study, neither observations nor logic sup­
port the view that any appreciable amount of the time that separated 
reward from nonreward groups on the final problem (which was over 
three minutes in this study and over two minutes in the first) could 
have been taken up by activities designed to insure the correctness 
of the 27-4 = 23 solution. Furthermore, it was reported in the first
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study that reward subjects made more errors than nonreward sub­
jects, a fact which supports the belief that reward performance 
overall was inferior to that of the nonreward subjects. The same 
thing was true in the present study. There were eight errors made 
by reward subjects compared to two by nonreward subjects. Also im­
pressive is the result that seven of twenty reward subjects as com­
pared to only two of the twenty nonreward subjects contributed to 
these totals. Were reward subjects taking greater care to check 
their answers, it would be difficult to explain why they made so 
many more errors.
The results again showed the importance of mathematical 
ability as a predictor of solution time. The correlation of ACT 
percentiles with solution times on problem ten was even larger than 
in Experiment I, £ = =.41, £<.05. The importance of math ability 
as a determinant of solution time independent of the problem number 
is indicated by the highly significant ACT main effect, in the re­
peated measures analysis, £(1,28)= 16.27, £<.001.
Attitude data.
The initial post-experimental semantic differential which 
inquired into subjects' attitudes toward the water-jar task produced 
the expected result that subjects generally view the task as attrac- 
. tive. Scores on the task-attitude semantic differential could range 
from a low of 7 to a high of 49. The observed range was from 21 to 
49 with the mean score being 37.67. This means that on the seven 
7-point evaluative scales, the average rating was 5.38. More
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interesting, however, than knowing that college students subjects 
tend to find the water jar problems attractive is knowing whether 
subject performance in the reward group can be patially predicted 
by knowing the subject's attitude toward the task. That is, if 
attractiveness is indeed one of the dimensions which determines when 
reward will facilitate and when it will disrupt performance, there 
should be a positive correlation in the reward group between the 
rated attractiveness of the task and the time it took to find the 
solution to problem ten. Data from reward subjects in the present 
study, however, show absolutely no relation, t_ = .02. Lack of 
variability in the attractiveness measure could well account for 
this nonsignificant result. For an adequate test, one would need 
attitude scores which range from aversive to attractive rather than 
have scores which vary only at the attractive end of the scale as 
in the present study.
To determine whether attitudes toward the task in particu­
lar and the research in general were negatively affected by reward 
and whether there were differences as a function of time, data from 
the semantic differentials administered both immediately after and 
two weeks after the experiment were used in groups-by-trials ana­
lyses of variance. There were two of these: one for the subject's
attitude toward the task and one for his attitude toward the research 
in which he had participated. In neither of these analyses were 
there any significant effects. Attitude as measured by semantic 
differentials did not differ by group and did not change over time 
nor was there any interaction. For the task-attitude scales, the
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reward mean went from 38.17 on the first to 37.55 on the second; 
the nonreward mean went from 38.53 on the first to 37.71 on the 
second. For the research-attitude scale, the reward mean went 
from 41.67 on the first to 39.22 on the second; the nonreward 
mean went from 40.88 on the first to 40.41 on the second.
CHAPTER IV 
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Because the principal purpose of the present study was to 
add to the literature on the detrimental effects of reward, we 
selected water jar problems for our task because they had not been 
previously used to investigate the effects of incentives and because 
problem ten of the series seemed to share two crucial characteris­
tics with other tasks that have been used to produce a detrimental 
effect. These were attractiveness and a "blocked" solution requiring 
heuristic behavior. Discovery that reward did disrupt performance on 
problem ten of the water-jar series lends some credence to the impor­
tance of these characteristics but, of course, the present study in 
no way provided a test of their importance as boundary conditions.
The evidence in the present study for a detrimental effect 
of reward along with that from other studies cited in the introduc­
tion raises the question of why the assumption that reward is faci­
litating should be so generally held. A possible answer comes from 
the fact that we have largely limited our research into reward's ef­
fects on performance to tasks that are unattractive and have algo­
rithmic solutions. Reward i^ facilitating if one looks only at the 
latency, rate, or persistence of some well-honed, and therefore 
generally unattractive, act. But even given the limitations on our
29
30
selection of tasks and dependent measures for use in research on 
reward's effects it is puzzling that reward should be so widely 
viewed as capable of improving but not hindering performance since 
theoretical predictions for detrimental effects or reward have 
been with us for some time. Yerkes and Dodson published their 
well-known work in 1909 and Spence did so in 1956.
One might think that given the work of Spence (1956) and 
Yerkes-Dodson (1908) nothing more needed to be said on the subject. 
This, however, is not true. First, Spence's extension of Hullian 
theory to include incentive effects is not compatible with the 
Yerkes-Dodson law in that, according to the latter, reward could 
have facilitating and detrimental effect on performance at a single 
task depending upon fluctuations in the level of motivation. This 
would not be predicted, however, from the Hull-Spence equation, 
^=H(£+jC). Second, while the Yerkes-Dodson law has been frequently 
invoked by investigators manipulating a variety of motivational 
factors, planned studies (e.g. Broadhurst, 1959) have generally used 
aversive stimulation as the means of raising motivational level to 
the point where it disrupts performance. To produce a detrimental 
effect using reward it has been sufficient to offer small amounts of 
money to adults or candy to children and on some occasions this offer 
has even been noncontingent. In the present study, for example, re­
ward subjects were under no time pressure and thus were assured of 
the maximum reward if they but did their arithmetic properly. As a - 
final illustration of why the case for the detrimental effects of
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reward is not closed, we need only to note that it is not at all 
clear how reward's effect on the production of responses initially 
low in the habit hierarchy serves as an explanation for the occur­
rence of detrimental effects in discrimination learning and con­
cept formation where competing responses should have equal rather 
than differential strengths at the start of training. Incidental 
learning poses a special problem since the detrimental effect oc­
curs on learning for which no incentive is offered.
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FOOTNOTES
1. A water-jar problem is best defined by an example: A mother
sends her son to the well to get three quarts of water. She 
gives him a five-quart can and an eight-quart can. How can the 
boy get exactly three quarts of water using only these con­
tainers and not guessing at the amount?
2. Evidence from Luchins (1942) bolsters this contention. By put­
ting a set breaker in the middle of a series of dual solution 
problems, Luchins sought to "disrupt the tendency to repeat 
blindly the B-A-2C method. " In one study from the 1942 mono­
graph where Luchins' data are comparable to data collected here, 
84 per cent of the college-age students continued to use the set 
solution despite their experience with the set breaker.
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APPENDIX A 
LITERATURE REVIEW
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The literature review done in conjunction with the disser­
tation research was extensive but will not be reproduced in full 
here because it is to be published in David Greene and Mark R.
Lepper (Eds.), The Hidden Costs of Reward, Hillsdale, N. J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, book in preparation. This will be a 
more readily available source than the present and therefore only 
a synopsis of the review paper appears below.
Section A of the paper reviewed studies which had shown re­
ward to have a detrimental effect on performance and noted that the 
evidence for a detrimental effect came from studies employing a 
wide variety of tasks in which a large number of subject and method­
ological parameters have been varied. In Section B the question of 
when reward would prove to be detrimental and when facilitating was 
considered. A comparison of tasks on which there is facilitation 
with tasks on which there is a detrimental effect seemed to suggest 
that there are two important dimensions along which a task must be 
scaled before a prediction for the effect of reward on performance 
can be made. These were the attractive-aversive and algorithmic- 
heuristic dimensions. If a task is aversive to the subject then 
reward can not be expected to disrupt his performance. To the con­
trary, it will improve it. But it is not sufficient for a task to 
be attractive to the subject. It must also be designed such that 
the subject who is superior at heuristic behavior will have a per­
formance advantage. In verbal learning, therefore, the task had
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to be designed so that subjects could considerably shorten the 
associative learning process by developing mediating and coding 
strategies of their own to relate otherwise unrelated items and 
to differentiate otherwise similar items. In concept formation, 
the task had to be one employing enough dimensions that breaking 
down the stimuli into mere concatenations of stimulus values would 
not be an obvious way to proceed. In the more complex problem 
solving tasks, there was the similar requirement that direct dis­
covery of the first step for the solution be somehow blocked. In 
perceptual recognition, the requirement was that subjects neither 
have nor be given a set for what they are to perceive. In con­
cluding Section B it was noted that incidental learning formed a 
special case in that the effect of reward on incidental learning 
was mediated by the offer of reward for intentional learning. Be­
cause it may be "incidental learning" which accounts for the super­
ior performance of nonreward subjects on tasks requiring heuristic 
solutions, it was suggested that determining the reason for re­
ward's effect in the incidental learning paradigm may provide an 
explanation for reward's detrimental effect elsewhere.
After laying out what appear to be the crucial features for 
determining when a task will be susceptible to a detrimental ef- 
rect of reward, it was pointed out that emphasis on these dimen­
sions was not wholly original. Spence (1956) used the position of 
the correct response in the habit family hierarchy as a determin­
ant of the effect of incentive on performance and that notion 
covers much of what is meant by making the nature of the solution
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(algorithmic or heuristic) a determinant of reward's effect. Al­
gorithmic solutions would translate as responses that are readily 
available at the top of the hierarchy, and heuristic solutions 
would be those that are initially low in the hierarchy. Spence's 
prediction, then, that incentive (1() would retard discovery of the 
correct solution when it was low in the hierarchy but facilitate 
it when high in the hierarchy is the same as the prediction that 
heuristic solutions will be slowed but algorithmic solutions 
facilitated by the offer of reward. If anything important was 
added to Spence's account it must lie in the inclusion of the 
aversive-attractive dimension as a second determinant. But again, 
credit for first focusing on this distinction must lie elsewhere, 
since Lepper and Greene (1975) used it in explaining when reward 
would show a detrimental effect on level of motivation. Their dis­
tinction was the same only they used the terms "work" and "play" to
—    ««-asfcjrv . ■
describe it.
In sum, then, the chief value of the review paper must lie 
in its integration and reinterpretation of a large number of 
studies around the central theme of detrimental effects of reward. 
While provisions for the detrimental effects of reward have been 
with us for a long time in our theoretical orientations— in addi­
tion to Hull-Spence theory there is the Yerkes-Dodson law--detri- 
mental effects appear to have been overlooked in our research em­
phases. Almost exclusively, research into reward's effects has 
focused on studies within the aversive-algorithmic task sector.
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From the present view this is a mistake since the attractive- 
heuristic sector is certainly as widely represented by tasks 
outside the laboratory. An implication which can be drawn from 
this is that, potentially, rewards detrimental effects are as 
widespread as its benefits.
APPENDIX B 
STATISTICAL TESTS
Experijnent 1 
One-way PUKNR. for Solukion Times on Problan Ten 
(Reward N=14, Nonreward N=13)
Source df F
Incentive 117,428.57 1 5.58 g<^.05
Error 21,048.70 25
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Experiment 1 
Groips X Trials ANOTA for Soliitibn Times 
(Reward N=14, Nonreward If=13)
Source 16
9925.84Between
Incentive (A) 57451.00 
Error 8024.84
Within 7279.50
Trials (B) 58837.77
A X B 10092.55
Error 5104.65
26
1
25
243
9
9
225
7.16
11.53
1.98
.01
.00
.04
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Ejçeriment 2 
ÎV)0-«ay ANCMl for Solution Times en PrdDlem Ten 
(Reward N=16, Nonreward N=16)
Sourœ
Total 67,700.250 31
Inœntive (A) 173,415.188 1 3.4753 .0696
ACT (B) 229,554.625 1 4.6003 .0386
A X E 298,556.000 1 5.9823 .0199
Error 49,899.391 28
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Ebçeidiiient 2 
Repeated Ifeasures for Solution Times
(Reward N=16, Nonravard N=16)
Sourœ 16 F £
Total 16,541.48 319
Between 25,488.90 31
Inœntive (A) 93,062.06 1 6.3039 .0172
ACT (B) 240,172.31 1 16.2690 .0006
A X B 43,570.81 1 2.9514 .0933
Error 14,762.52 28
Within 15,578.39 288
Trials (C) 92,668.44 9 8.5682 .0000
A X C 26,937.28 9 2.4907 .0098
B X C 29,385.84 9 2.7131 .0051
A X B X C 47,519.96 9 4.3938 .0001
Error 10,815.34 252
44
APPENDIX C 
INSTRUCTIONS TO SUBJECTS
The problans I have for you to work today are called water^ 
jar or water-biacket problems. You nay have had problopns like these 
before either as brain twisters or as a type question on an intel­
ligence test. Water-jar problems are best defined by an exaiiple, 
so let ms give you one; A mother sends her son to the well to get 
three quarts of water. She gives him a five-quart and an eiÿit- 
quart bucket to do that with. How can the boy get exactly three 
quarts of water using just these oontainers and not guessing at the 
amount? The answer is for the bey to fill the larger, eight-quart 
bucket to the top and then to use the five-quart bucket as a measure 
to measure out exactly five quarts from the eiÿit-quart bucket.
That leaves exactly three quarts in the eight-quart bucket vhich, 
of course, is the solution to the prcblan. Now, in all, you will have ten 
problems of this general sort to work. Let's begin by looking at 
some saitple problems. (EXPERIMENTER PROCEEDS THROUGH FIVE SAMPLE 
PROBLEMS ŒITING THE SUBJECT TO GIVE HIS ANSWER IN FORMULA FORM AS 
WILL BE REQUIRED DURING THE TASK.)
Now, during the task I'm going to have you write your answer 
rather than tell it to me. You should do so on these slips of paper. 
(BOCKLET OF TEN ANSWER SHEETS, EACH NUMBERED, IS GIVEN TO SUBJECT.)
Ose this side of each slip for your answer. You itey use any of the 
rest for scratch work. Here's some additional paper should you need it.
When you finish writing your answer and vrtien you are sure it is
45
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ooxxectf then tear off the ansver sheet and put it in this box
along with the problem card. Once you have put the question and your answer
in the box, please do not return to either.
Time in this task is not crucial. I will give you as long as 
you need to find the correct answer to each of the problems. I'm 
interested only in the solution you find and hew you go about finding it.
I should stress that each problem does have a solution and if you per­
sist you will find it.
While you are working on the ten problems in this task, I'm 
going to leave you alone since no one likes to have someone looking over 
their shoulder while they are trying to solve problems. Consequently 
I'll go back into the next rocm. Now from there I can see into here throi#i 
that one-way mirror, and I'll be checking from time to time to 
see hew you are coming. If during the task you should have any 
questions just come back and ask me and if, at the end, I fail to 
notice that you have finished, then just come back and get me, ok^?
If you have no questions, you nay begin v*enever you are ready.
REWARD INSTRUCTIONS: Instructions to reward subjects were identical
except that just prior to the sentence "If you have no questions, 
you nay begin vAienever you are reacfy", the following instructions were 
added: "One last thing I should mention is that I've found it help­
ful if I motivate people a little to get them to woric until they find 
a correct answer on each of the problems. To do that. I'll give
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you five cents for each correct answer and a fifty-oent (Eüç).!)/
one-dollar (Ebç. 2) bonus if they are all correct. This means
that you will get a dollar/ dollar and a half if all ten prdolens
are correct, 45* if nine are correct, and so on. People do much
better vhen rewarded and so, for the time and energy it saves me,
it's well worth it. If you have no questions you nay begin vhenever you are
ready. I'll check your answers vhen you have finished and pay you then."
APPEMDIX D 
i m  DATA
Experiment 1. Solution Time in Seconds for Subjects in the
Nonreward Group. Nonset Solutions Underlined
Problem Number
Subject Category________________________*1 *3 H  #5 *6 #7 #8 *9 ^10
Subjects who broke set only on 
Problem Ten
Subjects who broke set on only 
one problem prior to Ten and 
then reverted to B-A-2C.
Subjects who broke set on two 
or more problems prior to Ten.
Subjects who never broke set.
Subjects who never established 
o set due to errors early in the 
series
** Errors ore starred (*) and nonset solutions ore underlined.
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114 88 38 40 25 36 26 63 24 215
100 171 88 132 134 69 83 56 63 216.
80 46 32 39 22 29 40 39 36 138
106 58 60 80 40 49 69 54 48 137
65 49 60 71 38 42 34 53 38 63
84 69 56 69 27 39 37 28 23 38
381 218* 61 48 92 15 45 71 35 27
59 83 71 108 67 41 67 47 49 92
49 31 27 34 34 32 20 38 38 15
63 110 56 68 128 22 11 24 22 17_
99 62 85 82 296 32 20 23 30 12.
199 78 42 100 120 15 126 18 26 40
.277 113 49 56 47 27 24 16 21 51*
409* 343* 446 * 62 62 16 09 9L 06
495* 203* 127*296 150 43 18 330T' 140* 2 1
Experiment 1. Solution Time in Seconds for Sub{ects in the Reward Group.
Problem Number
Subject Category #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 #6 *7 #8 #9 #10
Subjects who broke set only 76 62 45 36 48 38* 51* 25* 33 352
on Problem Ten
152 71 117 96 123 78 40 34 37 97
169 95 72 75 68 59 52 78 89 431
340 50 74 72 48 49 51 68 41 359
182 418 96 44 38 16 19 25 25 E.
82 76 47 167 42 33 43 44 45 E
117 74 74 82 304 75 92 96 58 262
Subjects who broke set on 
only one problem prior to
207 574* 92 183 80 U 271 91 51 130
Ten ond then reverted to 72 91 169* 87 144 66 77 54 88 280
B-A-2C.
Subjects who broke set on two 56 65 39 50 41 30 58 23 75 Û1
or more problems prior to Ten.
214* 92 70 77 78 54 27 15 18 09
Subjects who never broke 162 197 73 64 64 57 61 46 52 NS'
set. (NS=no solution)
141* 118 38 108 40 40 43 27 64 389*
77 51 32 48 81* 30 37 56 28 306*
Subjects who never established 
a set due to errors early in the
NS* 126 NS* 342' 250 14 71 214 37 12
series.
Errors ore starred (*) and nonset solutions ore underlined. NS=no solution, meaning 
that the subject gave up without finding on answer.
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Experiment 2 . Solution Time in Seconds” and ACT Moth Usage
Percentage Scores  ^ for Subjects in Nonreward Group.
set Number ACT #1 #2 #3 #4 *5 #6 *7 #8 #9 #10
1 .71 87 63 37 42 30 29 30 24 20 116
2 N A 67 132 39 55 41 64 102 58 298 25
3 .69 60 32 30 37 30 25 26 45 34 26
4 .96 99 127 44 164 81 109 104 109 76 19
5 .69 81 107 114 118 81 55 94 63 113 40
6 .30 93 68 62 210 100 36 42 51 34 227
7 N A 33 39 28 69 46 30 39 24 26 13
8 .73 158 40 '46 48 52 54 50 45 38 576
9 .89 74 65 87 31 29 28 17 22 20 259
10 .62 400 380 218 352 43 52 30 45 55 342
11 .66 127 58 53 53 122 151 73 68 77 107
12 .48 60 142 67 92 55 75 42 48 47 304
13 NA 174 137 78 128 70 170 89 63 93 88
14 .81 140 76 42 46 25 23 50 29 17 37
15 .62 90 46 52 67 85 81 58 86 62 24
16 .69 78 243 70 106 80 114 77 60 38 89
17 .81 93* 35 76 113 55 56 71 69 47 56
18 .98 34 28 47 79 32 28 27 31 25 36
19 .11 90 454 75 204 137 45 76 60 191 38
20 NA 49 63 55 48 56 23 58 11J 41 34
Errors are starred (*) 
N A  = not available
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Experiment 2 . Solution Time In Seconds  ^and ACT Moth Usage
Percentile Scores For Subjects in the Reward Group
Problem Number
Subjects ^ ACT #1 #2 #3 u #5 #6 *7 #8 #9 #10
1 .40 48 32 163* 48 68 123 258 73 52 1113*1
2 .99 41* 65 57 111 67 48 94 51 34 113
3 .99 123 45 59 43 46 24 34 42 24 88
4 NA 149 190 67 186 69 60 67 82 68 2400*1
5 .30 97 162 98 92 187 207 106 89 75 285
6 .11 125 117 87 106 132 97 109 88 45 198
7 .93 79 52 42 51 44 37 63 23 19 54
8 .84 82 43 55 93 46 52 52 84 37 75
9 .61 80 75 56 69 66 87 28 23 20 401*
10 .82 58 96 68 152 51 98 76 72 154 14
11 NA 256 68 81 108 83 77 60 73 30 129
12 .86 110 83 69 124 97 39 43 29 123 370
13 .61 97 99 74 67 169 71 40 50 28 1317
14 .23 176 299 95 59 158 92 59 67 67 986
15 N A 100 130 117 77 107 57 80 164* 75 30
16 N A 60 33 55 53 30 34 34 28 26 62
17 .82 99 84 51 76 66 87 49 36 28 137
18 .17 149 555 126 170 64 208 237 161 116 1680*1
19 .84 162 242 109 116 120* 146 137 124 74 36
20 .11 120 78 67 191 86 110 219 54 97 48
** Errors are starred (*) 
^NA = not available
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